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THE INTERACTION OF RELIGION, LAW, AND




This study is an attempt, from the point of view of the institutional
historian, to characterize the nature and effects of the tie between the
organized spiritual power and the civil government in Western society
at various periods and in different countries. The relationship is viewed
not only in its effects on the movements of religious and political liberty,
but as the resultant of forces originating in opinion as well as in legis-
lation.
The association between the churches and civil societies must be
regarded as a changing, in fact an evolutionary one. If the latter undergo
constant transformation as a result of their contact with the churches, no
less can be said of the former. This is as true of the Roman Catholic as
of the Protestant Churches, for, under the rule of hypothesis, the first
of these recognizes arrangements and compromises forbidden under
strict law or thesis. This is acknowledged in a striking passage of the
Encyclical of Leo XIII, Immortale Dei (1885), when he declares under
the caption, "No one form of government condemned, nor all toleration
of error," that "The Church, indeed, deems it unlawful to place various
forms of Divine Worship on the same footing as the true religion, but
does not, on that account, condemn those rulers who for the sake of
securing some great good, or of hindering some great evil, tolerate in
practice that these various forms of religion have a place in the State."'
If the American public, therefore, ever expected past tensions
generated by religious controversy to subside with time, it has been
sharply reminded by their revival in the recent dispute over proposals
* Professor of History and Chairman, Department of Social Science Education, Gradu-
ate School of Education, Yeshiva University.
1. EHLER & MORRALL, CHURCH AND STATE THROUGH THE CENTURIES: A COLLECTION OF
ILLUSTRATIVE DocUmENTs 315 (1954).
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for subventions to parochial schools that the past, mutable though it is,
still exercises an influence over the present.
II
Law, which is functionally related to the state, and religion have, in
fact, been intimately linked since primitive times. Like law, which in
the tribal or pre-modern society is "personal" rather than territorial,
religion is tribal rather than individual or universal in its early stages.'
Though their mutual influence continues, law and religion in advanced
societies sooner or later come to a parting of the ways. The explanation
lies in the growth of the community and in the consequent diversification
of religious affiliations, so that "it ultimately becomes necessary to find
a common standard of justice among men who belong to different
religions."8 But the recollection of an earlier order of things often con-
tinues to affect the relations of church and state under the new one.
Above all, Judaism, Christianity and Islam laid claim to a universality
which took political forms. In Christian society the claim of the church-
state to exclusive salvation produced religious wars and persecutions.
"Religious liberty in Christendom logically involved the secularization
of the State," after severe struggles with the older religio-political con-
ception based on the collaboration of the "two powers."4
It is not strange, therefore, that the relation of religion and politics
constitutes one of the dynamic issues of history, especially of European
and American history, for if there is one thing that distinguishes
Western from non-Western societies it is precisely in the peculiar tension,
as Christopher Dawson has put it, that has existed between the religious
and secular powers.' It is, of course, sometimes difficult to distinguish
periods of conflict from those of equilibrium in European history. Yet
a comparison with Oriental, Classical, and Islamic societies must bring
out the unmistakable fact that rivalry, occasionally latent but always
palpable, has marked the relations of the "two powers" throughout their
joint history. If in addition Western history boasts achievements such
as progress, liberty and science, it is also not unreasonable to treat them
as incidents, if not results, of the distinctive historic interaction between
religion and politics.'
The dynamism implicit in these relations has its counterpart within
religion itself. Professor Albright discerns within the Judeo-Christian
religious community a tension between "an institutionalized hierarchy
of religious functionaries and an upsurge of charismatic spiritual leaders"
2. JExs, THE STATE AND THE NATION 61 (1935).
3. Id. at 84.
4. 2 MooRE, HISTOaY oF RELIGIONS VIII (1928).
5. DAWSON, RELIGION AND THE RISE OF WESTERN CULTURE 17 (1950). See generally
DAWSON, op. cit. supra.
6. LATREILLE & SIEGFRIED, LEs FoRcEs RELIGIEVUSES ET LA VIE POLrTIQUE 70 (1951).
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productive of the "self-critical continuum of Judeo-Christianity."7 The
opposition of prophets to priests in ancient Judaism, the checks and
balances between hierarchy and orders in the Roman Catholic Church
and the lay preachers replacing a priesthood in the Protestant Churches,
are manifestations of this continuing dichotomy in Western spiritual
life which parallel and perhaps explain the similar balancing of temporal
and religious interests in society.8
Of the reality of this interaction during the formative period of
European civilization and of its importance for the institutions that
we regard as typically European, a few examples will have to suffice.
The connection of the church (either by way of example, or by con-
vergence of effort, or even by reaction) with the growth of popular
institutions in the Middle Ages seems certain.' The assemblies or
placita of the Frank period are often traced in their origin to church
councils as well as to the popular assemblies of the Germania."° Cer-
tainly it is as difficult to distinguish between the ecclesiastical and the
temporal ordinances issued in these bodies as it is in the contemporary
Anglo-Saxon assemblies.'
Interesting as an illustration of the general dualism pervading
medieval institutions is the persistent division of labor in the civil services
between "literate 'clerks' and illiterate 'serjeants' or 'knights.' ,,12 Even
the Papal service, as Mr. Johnson points out, requires that the bulls or
leaden seals on Papal letters be affixed by laymen who are "ex officio
illiterate."'"
A parallelism of development rather than a direct influence of the
Dominican Convocation on English parliamentary representation is all
that can be urged for church influence on this vital aspect of constitutional
growth.' 4 But the continued rivalry between the crown and the church
in England, no less than in France, had much to do with the development
of representative institutions in both countries.'
5
7. William F. Albright, Samuel and the Beginnings of the Prophetic Movement 19-20,
Goldenson Lecture, Hebrew Union College (1961).
8. Ibid.
9. 1 ES MEI, ELEMENTS DE DROIT CONSTrr TONNEL FRAN4AIS ET COMPARA 79 (7th ed.
1921).
10. DUMAS, MANUEL D'HISTOME DU DRorr FRANgAIS 39 (1950); EsmEIN, Couas
ELEMENTAIRE D'HIsTOIR DU DROrr FRANOAIS 68 (15th ed. 1930).
11. MAKOWER, THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY AND CONSTITUTION OF THE CHURCH OF
ENGLAND 8 (Eng. trans. 1895).
12. Charles Johnson, Royal Power and Administration, in LEGACY OF THE MIDDLE AGES
493, 502-03 (1948).
13. Id. at 493,
14. McIlwain, The Medieval Estates, in 7 CAMBRIDGE MEDIEVAL HISTORY 670-71
(Tanner & others eds. 1958).
15. See BARKER, DOMINICAN ORDER AND CONVOCATION 53 (1913). For an exaggerated
inference, see FORD, REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 103 (1924). See generally BARKER, op.
cit. supra.
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The entire state concept as developed by the French jurist Bodin
can, in fact, only be understood as a response by advocates of absolute
monarchy seeking to bolster the claims of the "king's estate" against
those of the church. "The modern State concept was born of the Western
Church concept."' 6
These examples, drawn mainly from the history of our political
institutions, serve at least to underline the close reciprocal influence
exerted between the constitutional orders of church and state throughout
the Middle Ages. Their mutual influence in modem times has been the
subject of an abundant literature, aspects of which will be examined
below.
III
The problem raised by the relations of church and state has been
viewed as a legal one. Ruffini in his classic study of "Religious Liberty"
treated his subject as a legal rather than a theological or a philosophical
inquiry. By this he meant that the most fruitful concept to be examined
historically was one that viewed it in terms of juridical institutions
rather than of ecclesiastical privilege or philosophical right.17 The legal
ramifications stand out in other fundamental respects. Sir Henry Maine
has described in several notable pages the influence of Roman jurispru-
dence, especially the law of contract, on Western ideas of free will and
necessity, distinguishing it from the more purely metaphysical influence
exerted by Greek philosophy on the theology of the Greek East. s
The legal spirit inherited from ancient Rome has in fact armed
both parties to the conflict of church and state. Christian society has
never been "Christian" in the sense that Islamic society has been
"Islamic" and theocratic, because the Roman legal tradition has not
only transmitted to Western nations the state concept but because "the
written Revelation itself has been unable to take the place of the
'written reason' represented by the Law."' 9 Canon law was the pendant
as well as the rival of the civil law during the Middle Ages, for it em-
bodied like the sister system some part of the Roman tradition. It was
this dual legacy that prevented the identification of law and religion in
Western society, as it was the absence of a similar dualism that explains
the opposite course pursued by Islamic history.2 ° Christianity may have
16. C. J. FRIEDRICH, CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT AND DEMOCRACY 16 (1950).
17. RUFFINI, RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 4-5 (1912).
18. MAINE, ANCIENT LAW 294-303 (World's Classics ed. 1931).
19. BOUCHt-LECLERCQ, L'INTOL-RANCE RELIGIEUSE ET LA PoLrrIQUE 346 (1924). It must
be pointed out that the same spirit informs the common law which, whatever its substance,
owes much on the side of jurisprudence and political ideas to Roman legal models as inter-
preted by Glanvill, Bracton and others. MCILWAIN, CONSTrrUTIONALISM: ANCIENT AND
MODERN 57-61 (1959); MAITLAND, SELECT PASSAGES FROM THE WORKS OF BRACTON AND AZo
XIV (Selden Society ed. 1895).
20. 2 BRYCE, STUDIES IN HISTORY AND JURISPRUDENCE 240-46 (1901).
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been based on grace, not law originally,2 ' but Christian society since
the 4th century is impossible to understand without taking account of
the legal influences just described.
However, having paid our respects to legality, we must add that
behind the forms stand social realities, especially public opinion, which
constantly impinge on and transform legal arrangements no matter how
strictly defined. The outlines of this interaction in 19th century England
have been drawn by Dicey in a classic work.22 The links between the
State and society, between law and opinion, are not always so clear as
they might be. But in political parties as organized in liberal societies
we do see a link between a "voluntary association within a social frame-
work" and the constitutional order.2" Such particularly are the political
parties in France, Italy, Germany, Holland and Belgium which under
various labels derive their social principles from the teachings of the
Roman Catholic Church.
The distinction is clearly stated by Troeltsch:
In the current sense, the idea of the "social" means a definite,
clearly defined section of the general sociological phenomena-
that is, the sociological relations which are not regulated by the
State, nor by political interest, save in so far as they are in-
directly influenced by them. This sociological section is com-
posed of the various questions which arise out of economic life,
the sociological tension between various groups with different
customs and aims, division of labor, class organization, and
some other interests which cannot be directly characterized as
political, but which actually have a great influence on the
collective life of the State; since the development of the
modern Constitutional State, however, these interests have
definitely separated themselves from it. The social problem,
therefore, really consists in the relation between the political
community and these sociological phenomena which, although
they are essentially non-political, are yet of outstanding im-
portance from the political point of view.24
But we must turn to history.
IV
The classical world knew no problem of church and state. Religion
was a department of state in ancient Rome. Christianity, which sought
21. Ibid.
22. A. V. DICEY, LECTURES ON THE RELATION BETWEEN LAW AND PUBLIC OPINION IN
ENGLAND DuRINo THE NINETEENTH CENTURY (2d ed. 1914). For the history of ecclesiastical
legislation, see id. at 311-60 (lecture X).
23. SCHIEDER, THE STATE AND SOCIETY IN OUR TawS: STUDIES IN THE HISTORY OF THE
NINETEENTH AND TWENTIETH CENTURIES 54, 55, 60, 61 (Sym transl. 1962).
24. 1 TROELTScH, THE SocIAL TEACHING OF THE CHRISTIAN CHURCHES 28, (Gore
transl. 1949).
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at first to maintain itself as a distinct society, succeeded in rending the
seamless web. By proclaiming a distinction between the duties due to
God and those due to Caesar, Christianity initiated the greatest revolu-
tion in. history.25 The overthrow of the politico-religious system of the
ancient city by Judeo-Christianity was also revolutionary in introducing
into common thought other novel ideas and principles of action: the
uniqueness of God, the idea of an alliance of people and God, a tendency
toward theocracy, and a requirement of moral purity in members.2 6
This exclusive heritage of Christianity from Judaism promoted, if it
did not produce, a conflict with the Roman government, which had al-
ready launched a program of political integration through the Imperial
Cult and other measures.
The ancient religions in the Graeco-Roman world possessed several
characteristics that determined their relation to government. They were
not only national and civic cults, they were ritualistic, polytheistic and
anthropomorphic.2 8 Unlike Christianity they lent themselves more or
less readily to various types of syncretism."9 Though Christianity was
adopted by the Roman Empire and though it almost became a depart-
ment of state, the distinction between state and religion which was
laid down during the period of its persecution survived. The Emperor
Constantine linked but did not merge the two. The result, according to
Rousseau, has been ever -since to prevent countries from pursuing a
"bonne politique. ' '30
The linking of Christianity, which meant the Christian church, with
the state raised the question of the precise relationship between them.
In Islam the problem of the relations of the two powers was solved by
bestowing them both on one person, the Caliph, who thus became, in
certain respects, a combined Pope and Emperor.1
In European Christendom a theory was worked out concerning the
church-state relation which with some modifications dominated Western
thought to the time of the Reformation. According to this theory, which
was first clearly expressed at the close of the 5th century by Pope
Gelasius, society is ruled by two powers, the spiritual and the temporal,
both equal in practice, though unequal in "importance," each distinct
25. FUSTEL DE COULANGES, THE ANCIENT CITY 390-93 (1956).
26. LATREILLE & SIEGFRIED, op. cit. supra note 6, at 18.
27. HoMo, LES EMPLREURS ROMAINS ET LE CHRISTIANISME 35, 46, 85 (1931); GUTER-
MAN, RELIGIOUS TOLERATION AND PERSECUTION IN ANCIENT RomE, chs. 1, 7 (1951). See
generally GUTERMAN, Op. cit. supra.
28. LATREILLE & SIEGFRIED, op. cit. supra note 26, at 11.
29. HoMo, op. cit. supra note 27, at 85-118. HoMo, DE LA RoME PAIENNE A LA ROME
CHR T IENE, passim (1950).
30. ROUSSEAU, CoNTAT SOCIAL V, p. 8 (1826); EsmEI, op. cit. supra note 10, at 141.
31. The caliph did not, however, undertake to interpret the sacred law, officially at
least, 2 BRYCE, op. cit. supra note 20, at 240-41. Goeje, Caliphate, in 5 ENcYCLOPAEDiA
BRITANNICA 23 (11th ed. 1911).
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and yet joined in a common purpose.3" In a word, distinction and col-
laboration mark the relations of the two powers. This theory was more
easily adumbrated than executed. The two powers, whatever the theory,
were in conflict from the 11 th century to the close of the Middle Ages.
Four relations were thereafter imaginable." Theocracy, or the
dominance of the church over the state, was sought and perhaps
achieved in the period from the 11th to the 13th centuries that
included Popes such as Gregory VII, Innocent III, Gregory IX and
Innocent IV. The "direct power," which was claimed by these pontiffs
and brought to a head by Boniface VIII, could not prevail for long. It
yielded to the theory of the "indirect power" of the church over the
state which emphasized the Christian responsibilities of the temporal
ruler rather than his political subjection to the Pope. 4 Even this theory
proved ineffective after the 16th century, and theocracy, even in its
more limited application, became an anachronism. Under the rule of
hypothesis, the official position or thesis was adapted to circumstances.
Only in the Papal States until 1870 could a theocratic thesis survive in
practice.85
Caesaropapism, the subordination of the spiritual power to the
temporal, was characteristic of the later Roman Empire and of its
Byzantine continuation as well as of the empire of Charlemagne. In its
more modern form following the Reformation, and under the name of
Erastianism, it has stamped with its mark German Protestanism and
Anglicanism .
8 6
The regime sought in modern times by the Roman Catholic Church
and in theory by the established churches in the Protestant countries,
is one of equality between church and state manifested in some form of
jurisdictionalism. Unfortunately this also is more easily imagined than
practiced, for a prime condition of its existence is lacking. The church is
no longer in any modern state a legal power sharing sovereign authority
with the temporal officials. In the Middle Ages two legal powers were the
rule; modern sovereignty decrees one legal power, that of the State, and
in a democratic system, regards religion as a matter of individual and
voluntary choice and not of corporate privilege.1
7
32. Original text in MIRBT, QUELLEN ZUR GESCHICHTE DES PAPSTUMS UND DES Ro-
MISCHEN KATHIOLIZISMUS 85-88 (4th ed. 1924). English translation in EHLER & MORRALL,
op. cit. supra note 1, at 11. 1 CARLYLE, A HISTORY OF MEDIEVAL POLITICAL THEORY IN THE
WEST 184-93, 253-57 (circa 1903). For a recent statement of the problem raised in the
Gelasian theory, see ULLMANN, PRINCIPLES OF GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS IN THE MIDDLE
AoES 57 (1961).
33. For the following see CHENow, LE ROLE SOCIAL DE L'EoLIsE 137-67 (1928).
34. Id. at 149-57.
35. BOUCH -LECLERCQ, op. cit. supra note 19, at 347.
36. LATREILLE & SIEGF IED, op. cit. supra note 6, at 180-98.
37. 2 EsmEiN, ELEMENTS DE Daorr CONSTITUTIONNEL FRANqAIS ET COMPARA 604 (7th
ed. 1921).
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The result is that the religious conflicts in the 16th and 17th
centuries, which pitted opposing sectaries, Protestant and Roman
Catholic, against one another, differed from the medieval conflicts
between Popes and emperors. In one case the struggle was for the
possession of the one sovereign power located in the state; in the other
the conflict was between two legitimate claimants to power, each charging
the other with aggression. We shall in due course examine other aspects
and consequences of the theories of medieval dualism and modern
sovereignty and individualism, particularly as they affect national history.
The "Great Secularization," as Professor Butterfield describes the
transformation of European society after 1660, has brought an entirely
new type of conflict in its train." In the 19th century it arrayed the
national state, with its concern for civic and individual rights against the
Roman Catholic Church. In the 20th century it is the conflict between
the totalitarian state and the Christian churches, both Catholic and
Protestant, that has been the conspicuous feature of the age."9
The fourth relationship is separation, which is practiced in the
United States, France, Switzerland, Chile and other countries. Sepa-
ration has different purposes in each of these countries. In the
United States it was designed to prevent the dominance of any one sect,
but it did not mean the extrusion of religion, conceived in broad Prot-
estant terms, from state activities such as education. ° In France separa-
tion involved the cutting of ties with the Roman Catholic Church and was
carried through on a wave of anti-clericalism directed at the influence
of the Church.
It has been demonstrated that religious liberty can and has coexisted
with both separationist and jurisdictionalist systems,"' though coexistence
is less easily imagined under theocracy or caesaropapism. In fact,
the first formal avowal of the modern principle of religious liberty is
contained in the Confession of the Socinian sect adopted at Rakau, which
advocated a regime of religious establishment maintained by the state.
It was only state control, in the view of the leaders of this Unitarian
group, that would restrain fanaticism and protect minority religious
rights.4
2
It is one of the paradoxes of history that separation was first ad-
vocated by the most extreme of sectaries, the Anabaptists, whose ideas
fell on fertile ground in Holland where they influenced the views of the
Pilgrim Fathers.4 8 What they advocated was theocracy or church rule
38. BuTTERFIm , CnRIsTIANITY IN EUROPEAN HISTORY 35-40 (1954).
39. EHLER, TWENTY CENTURIES OF CHURCH AND STATE 109 (1957).
40. GREENE, RELIGION AND THE STATE-THE MAKING AND TESTING OF AN AmERICAN
TRADITION 94 (1959).
41. RUmINI, RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 510-22 (1912).
42. Id. at 86.
43. Id. at 101-05, 492.
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with its consequence of persecution of dissenters. If unable to secure
this, and only then as a pis aller, were they willing to accept separation
of church and state."
Inconsistent though they may appear, statements in 19th century
constitutions which give one church a privileged position and even a
monopoly but extend religious liberty to others, are sincere. The French
Charter of 1814, which declares in article V, "each one professes his
religion with an equal liberty and obtains for his cult the same pro-
tection," says in article VI, "The Catholic religion, apostolic and Roman,
is the religion of the State."45 Religious liberty is more often a question
of fact than of law or logic. No one system necessarily protects it every-
where, nor in the same way.
V
It is the effect of these events not merely on religious liberty but
on what the English writer Figgis described as its offspring, political
liberty, that deserves attention and of which an account must now be
given.
The idea of liberty under law is a legacy of classical antiquity, but
though law remained a ruling passion, liberty in its classical phase
withered in the later Roman Empire."6 Religion was a department of
state, and there was little chance of its exercising a restraint on govern-
mental power. The omnipotence of the ancient state was in fact implicit
from the first, but was only fully realized in the last period of the
Roman Empire.4 T "Born of authority the Roman Empire perished of
etatism."' *
Liberalism in the sense of a concern with individual rights
independently of the state was unknown to the classical world, at least in
law. What is sometimes mistaken for liberalism is the extension of
political rights to certain classes hitherto denied them and the extension
of civil or legal rights to the mass of free inhabitants living in free com-
munities. Also included is the restriction of the power of magistrates over
citizens.49 But the State had a complete claim on the life of the individual.
His existence was unthinkable outside the sphere of political society; he
was a political animal. Stoic notions of the priority of the individual to
society were later to be reinforced by Christianity, but their influence in
the pagan Empire was as yet theoretical."
44. Id. at 494.
45. 2 ESMEm, op. cit. supra note 37 at 604.
46. EsmEiN, COURs ELEMENTAIRE D'HISTOME DU DRoiT FRANqAIS 1-3 (15th ed. 1930);
MCILWAIN, CONSTITUTIONALISM: ANCIENT AND MODERN 43 (1959).
47. HoMo, NOUvELLE HISTOIRE Ro mAN 557 (1941).
48. Id. at 558.
49. FUSTEL DE COULANGES, THE ANCIENT CITY, bk. III, ch. 17 (1956). 1 ESMEIN, Op.
cit. supra note 37, at 33.
50. 1 CARLYLE, MEDIEVAL POLITICAL THEORY 98, 126, 144 (1903); MCILWAIN, GROWTH
OF POLITICAL THOUGHT IN THE WEST 106, 149 (1932).
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If the classical state contributed the conception of liberty under law
or legal government, the Christian Middle Ages added that of liberties
under custom and divine ordinance.51 A pluralistic society replaced the
totalitarian state of the late Empire.52 Its principal feature was the
partition of political power among a number of groups, secular and
ecclesiastical.5"
While secular authority fell increasingly into the hands of royalty,
especially in France and England, ecclesiastical power centered in the
Papacy from the 11 th and 12th centuries.54 Hence, there existed a dualism
which made any claims to sovereignty impossible during the Middle
Ages; 5 there raged struggles for superiority between the temporal and
the spiritual authorities; and, above all, there emerged the appeal of
secular power to theories of popular government, as later to theories of
direct divine sanction in support of its claims.56
Out of these contending forces eventually emerged political responsi-
bility of governments to wide electorates. But in the Middle Ages, as
Professor McIlwain has rightly insisted, the only limitation, aside from
the possibility of rebellion, was a legal one." The dramatic events of
King John's reign leading to the sealing of Magna Carta show the way
in which the church could join in the imposition of restraints on a
king bent on ignoring traditional rights.58 But in general the Middle
Ages only acknowledged legal responsibility on the part of a ruler and
provided no sanctions other than revolutionary ones for abuses of
authority. In thewords of Bracton, "the King is under no man, but under
God and the law."59
Professor Kern demonstrates that the transformation, from elements
already existing in the early Middle Ages, to cardinal principles of
modern constitutional government including those of legal limitation and
of popular representation and responsibility, is one of the most important
51. Guterman, Social Democracy and the Traditions of Western Constitutionalism, 6
N.Y.L.F. 121 (1960).
52. GIERKE, PoLicAL THEORIES OF THE MIDDLE AGES, passim (1951); Maitland, Intro-
duction to GIERKE, op. cit. supra; FIGGIS, CHURCHES IN THE MODERN STATE 54, 94-96 (1913).
53. ESMEiN, op. cit. supra note 46, at 167-76.
54. 3 TURMEL, HISTOIRE DES DoGmEs: LA PAPAUTf 277-334 (1933); ULLMANN, THE
GROWTH OF PAPAL GOVERNMENT IN THE MIDDLE AGES, passim (1955).
55. MAITLAND, THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF ENGLAND 506 (1931).
56. ACTON, ESSAYS ON FREEDOM AND PoWER 62, 146 (1948). See ULLMANN, PRINCIPLES
OF GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS IN THE MIDDLE AGES 19-28 (1961), for a discussion of the
"ascending and descending themes of government."
57. MCILWAiwt, GROWTH OF POLITICAL THOUGHT IN THE WEST 363 (1932). The author
distinguishes between limitation, present in the Middle Ages, and control, characteristic of
modern times.
58. JOLLIFFE, THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF MEDIEVAL ENGLAND 252 (2d ed. 1948).
See the editor's introduction in McKECHNIE, MAGNA CARTA (2d ed. 1914).
59. BRACTON, DE LEGIBUS ET CONSUETUDINIBUS ANGLIAE, bk. I, 'c. 8, cited in STUBBS,
SELECT CHARTERS 412 (9th ed. 1929) (Emphasis added).
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developments in constitutional history.6" "For better or for worse, the
course of Western Civilization has been set by the Medieval ideal of
legalistic dualism."'"
The regime of the two powers characteristic of the Middle Ages
casts its shadow in Roman Catholic and even in Protestant countries
into the 18th century. This was so in France, although the process by
which the royal authority subordinated the French Church to its own
rule in the system of Gallicanism made continuous progress.62
The Renaissance, the Reformation, the Reception of Roman law,
and the Wars of Religion destroyed the basis of the Medieval dualism
and hastened the advent of absolute government throughout Western
Europe. But the absolutism thus promoted adhered to princes and kings,
so-called national or pre-national rulers, and not to either of the
universal powers hitherto dominant, emperor or Pope.
6
1
"Cuius regio, eius religio," which meant a uniform religion in a
principality or kingdom and the domination of the church by territorial
rulers, became the established rule in Europe. This signified the end of
the Medieval dualism of church and state. The treaties of Augsburg,
1555,64 and Westphalia, 1648,65 like the Edict of Nantes, 1598,66 set the
seal on the tendency of the times to identify church membership with
territorial. sovereignty in the time honored formula, borrowed from
antiquity, which identified religion with the city. A long time was to
elapse before the rights of the territorial group were to yield to those
of the individual.
Even England did not escape the effects of absolute theories of
government following the advent of the Tudor dynasty and the establish-
ment of a state-dominated church. 67 Two centuries of struggle were
needed before the pretensions to absolute government of the Tudor and
Stuart rulers were checked by a combination of Parliament, lawyers and
Puritans.68
It was an alliance of Law and Religion that scored the victory in the
Glorious Revolution of 1688 at the very time when the Sun King Was
60. KERN, KINGSHIP AND LAW IN THE MIDDLE AGES 181 (Eng. transl. 1948).
61. WATKINS, POLITICAL TRADmON OF THE WEST 61 (1948).
62. EsmmIN, op. cit. supra note 46, at 633.
63. 2 BRYCE, STUDIES IN HISTORY AND JURISPRUDENCE 82 (1901); FoLz, L'IDEP D'EMPn
EN OCCIDENT DU Ve AU XIVe SIkCLE 160 (1953).
64. EHLER & MORRALL, CHURCH AND STATE THROUGH THE CENTURIES: A COLLECTION
OF ILLUSTRATIVE DOCUMENTS 166, arts. 2, 3, 10 (1954).
65. d. at 190, art. V, § 1.
66. Id. at 184, art. IX.
67. MCILWAIN, op. cit. supra note 46, at 95; McIlwain, The English Common Law,
Barrier Against Absolutism, 49 AMERICAN HISTORICAL REV. 28-31 (1943).
68. MCILWAIN, op. cit. supra note 46, at 99.
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declaring his will the major source of authority in church and state in
France. 9
It was the French example, not the English, unfortunately, that
exercised the greater influence in Europe after 1688, though Montesquieu
and Voltaire soon began to sway opinion in favor of English institutions.7"
The only element that was added in this period by rulers in Prussia,
Russia, Austria and Portugal was benevolence, thus creating the benevo-
lent despotisms of the 18th century. This regime began to bear heavily
on the churches in Prussia, Austria and France.71 In France, the Civil
Constitution of the Clergy represented the culmination of these tend-
encies.72
In the face of advancing absolutism, however, a new foundation
for dualism was being laid. Accompanying and following the increasing
secularization of society came the theory of natural law, which in the
17th and 18th centuries undertook to do what divine law had done in
the Middle Ages, namely to provide a legal norm on which reasonable
men could model the positive laws of kingdoms and states. 71 While the
Dutch jurist Grotius employed natural law principles, which he dis-
engaged from the mass of historical, especially Roman, precedents, in
the international field, the German jurist Puffendorf applied them to
the internal affairs of states, producing in the process an impressive
doctrine of constitutionalism.
74
But the theory of natural law proved unable to halt absolutism or
to take the place of the religious law of the Middle Ages. According to
Watkins, the answer to this insufficiency was found in Parliament, which,
following the English example, was supposed to represent that part of
the community having interests independent of the state.75
It is strange, however, that the advent of parliamentary rule in
England soon brought the end of the doctrine of fundamental law to
which Lord Coke had appealed.70
Parliament, according to this view, replaced the Church as a
potential means "of expressing the organized will of the community
against the pretensions of princes. 77 But this reliance on Parliament
69. ESMErN, op. cit. supra note 46, at 340; OLIVIER-MARTIN, HISTOIRE DU DROIT FRAN-
rAIs 337 (1951).
70. 1 EsMEIN, ELEMENTS DE DROIT CONSTITUTIONNEL FRANrAIS ET COMPAIk 69 (7th
ed. 1921).
71. SOEW, OUTLINES OF CHURCH HISTORY 202 (1931).
72. 2 ESMEIN, op. cit. supra note 70, at 609.
73. 1 ESMEIN, op. cit. supra note 70, at 274; WATKINS, POLITICAL TRADITION OF THE
WEST 62 (1948).
74. WATKINS, op. cit. supra at 65.
75. Id. at 82-83.
76. GOUGH, FUNDAMENTAL LAW IN ENGLISH CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 174 (1955).
77. WATKINS, op. cit. supra note 73, at 83.
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was misplaced because in England, its home, it produced a tyrannical
oligarchy in the 18th century. 7 It was impossible to mobilize the force of
secular society against kings and oligarchies "till the advent of new
classes to political power. ' 79 Only in the 19th century were parliamentary
institutions revitalized so that Parliament became a makeweight "to the
expanding power of modern bureaucracy."8 0
When in the 19th century Dicey spoke of the rule of law or German
publicists of the rechtstaat they no doubt recognized the existence of a
moral law as binding on their respective governments, but they really
meant the rules laid down by positive enactments in their countries."'
The religious element in these enactments was not extensive though the
indirect influence exerted by churches and religious thought on legisla-
tion may have been considerable.
Only in the United States, and to a lesser degree in France, did a
fundamental law form the basis of ordinary legislation and at least
in theory, limit the powers of government.82 But though these limita-
tions could and can hardly be described as originating in religious
conceptions, it nevertheless remains true that within the limits of the
non-political order in which they operate, the associations called churches
continue to exercise an influence on legislation and politics. This is as
true of countries in which separation prevails as of those in which
established churches of one kind or another exist.
But our discussion of the efforts made since the 17th century to
find a substitute for the legalistic dualism of the Middle Ages has
brought us to the 19th century, to the age of the national state in its
two principal forms, liberal and democratic. We must now turn to the
conflicts which occurred with the churches during the latter part of that
century.
VI
The classic struggles of the 19th century are familiar to all historians.
The conflict of the liberal state with the church in the later 19th century
was produced by three events: the progress of secularized public educa-
tion with its basis in the ideals of positivism and scientism; the growth in
the power of the state which liberalism accepted at first reluctantly,
but then in order to advance its own interests; and finally the Vatican's
measures of defense in the Syllabus of Errors and the Council of 1870,
which challenged the tenets of liberalism."
78. McIlwain, The English Common Law, supra note 67, at 30.
79. WATKINS, op. cit. supra note 73, at 89.
80. Ibid.
81. JONES, HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION TO THE THEORY OF LAW 87-97, 270 (1956).
82. For France, see DAVID & DE VRIES, THE FRENCH LEGAL SYSTEM 34 (1958).
83. Schieder, Political and Social Developments in Europe, in 11 NEW CAMBRIDOE
MODERN HISTORY 266 (Hinsley ed. 1962).
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In France it was a struggle of the new secular or lay forces rallied
round the republic against the teaching congregations and finally against
the authority of the papacy exercised over one side of French public life
through the Concordat. In England the struggle was not between free
thinkers and churchmen but between Protestant dissenters and Anglicans,
and it revolved principally around education. 4 In Germany the Kultur-
kamp] arrayed Bismark against the Catholic Church when the new
German State undertook to impose restrictions on the Catholic Church
and clergy following the Vatican Council.
It would not do to accept a definition of the liberal state derived
from the papal encyclicals of the 19th century, for they single out
features that may not be accepted by liberalism as sufficiently character-
istic marks of its regime, just as representatives of modernism have re-
fused to see in the encyclical Pascendi Gregis a correct statement of its
position. 5
The liberal state was individualistic, perhaps bourgeois, though
liberalism, which is separable from the liberal state, was compatible with
a certain amount of collectivism. 6 It was based on "liberty-autonomy,"
to use the pregnant phrase of Burdeau. It was the exact meeting point in
time of two forces, one designed to protect and promote the other, liberty-
participation and liberty-autonomy.87 It was a State of limited powers, of
limited democracy, of "democratie gouvern~e. ' ' 8
Yet it could be viewed through different spectacles depending on the
aspect on which the observer chose to fix his gaze. Schieder, for example,
emphasizes its adaptability to new conditions as well as certain of its
basic features. "European liberalism's past great achievement had
lain in creating and developing the liberal State, with its constitutionalism
and rule of law, and in insisting on certain political guiding principles
adopted later by all kinds of non-liberal movements and parties."8 9
Ripert, on the other hand, turning his attention to a later age, finds
an incompatibility between modern democracy, with its heritage from
the Revolution of the lay state, and the principles of morality and belief,
supernatural and Christian, entertained by the church. 0 "It is the
conflict of one religion with another." The same author insists that in
private law litigation the French laws of 1901, 1904 and 1905, as in-
84. HALVY, A HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH PEOPLE: EPILOGUE 1895-1905, 52-53 (1939).
85. VIDLER, THE MODERNIST MOVEMENT IN THE ROMAN CHURCH: ITS ORIGINS AND
OUTCOME 1-4 (1934).
86. A. V. DicEY, LECTURES ON THE RELATION BETWEEN LAW AND PUBLIC OPINION IN
ENGLAND DURING THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 211, 259 (2d ed. 1914); 5 BURDEAU, TRAITA
DE SCIENCE POLITIQUE 15 (1953).
87. BURDEAU, op. cit. supra 12.
88. Id. at 43-55.
89. Schieder, op. cit. supra note 83, at 262.
90. RIPERT, LE RkGIME DiMOCRATIQUE ET LE DROIT CIVIL MODERNE 90 (1936).
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terpreted in the name of laicity, ignored the rules of the civil law
governing agreements and gifts." In other words, "democracy does not
willingly tolerate rival powers." 9 Ripert then says that "in France . . .
one cannot conceive a democracy which would call itself Christian. ' 9
A similar attitude was expressed by McKechnie during the struggle
over the Parliament Bill when he declared: "Democracy, far from
embodying compromise, implies a monoply of power by one-half of
the people over the other half. Each party in turn is absolutely supreme,
without let or hindrance. Sovereignty is no longer divided between King,
Lords, and Commons, but is concentrated in the leaders of the party
in power, on the one condition that they continue to lead."9 4
Dicey, however, calls attention to the delusion that the democratic
form of government always favors the same kind of legislation. 5 After
noting96 the danger of disestablishment and disendowment in 1832,
he asks why this threat has been exorcised since. In other words, "What
have been the conditions of opinion which, in the sphere of ecclesiastical
legislation have prevented the dominant liberalism of the day from acting
with anything like its full force and have in many instances rendered
it subordinate to the strong cross-current of clerical or Church opinion?" 9
The answer is less important than the fact that Dicey is illustrating here,
of cross-currents of opinion "deflecting the action of the reigning
legislative faith." 98
The program of the liberal and democratic state did not, therefore,
by itself, bring it into conflict with the churches. There can be no
question regarding Protestantism, which was built around individualistic
rather than hierarchical notions, for aside from certain intellectual con-
flicts, it was well adapted to the liberal milieu because of the changes it
was undergoing in time and place.9 Its involvement in the struggles over
the questions of dogma and individual responsibility during the 16th
century, its immersion in the rationalistic and emotional currents of the
18th century and in the scientific and social movements of the 19th and
20th centuries had prepared it for an important role in liberal and
democratic society. This was true whether with the German it placed
"the accent on the interior life while accepting the discipline of the
exterior order," or with the Englishman it emphasized "the moral point
91. Id. at 88.
92. Id. at 89.
93. Id. at 90.
94. McKEcHNIE, THE NEW DE roACY AND THE CONSTITUTION 26 (1912).
95. DicEy, op. cit. supra note 86, at 55-61.
96. Id. at 312.
97. Id. at 317.
98. Id. at 40, 41, 312.
99. LATRF.LE & SIEcFRiED, LES FORCEs RELIGIEUSES ET LA VIE POLITIQuE 217 (1951).
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of view and the rite charged with religious virtue," or with the American
it was concerned "with the social duties of its members."100
. " The Roman Catholic Church, on the other hand, had a well defined
position concerning its relation to the liberal State that was less flexible.
It regarded itself as a societas perfecta, a perfect society of supernatural
origin. This was not merely a figure of speech. This society was visible,
hierarchical and sovereign. 10'
The state in Roman Catholic doctrine also had and still has a
distinct character and rights. It is limited in its authority, which it
shares with the church, especially in certain areas such as matrimony,
education and divorce. 10 2 Opposition to the church in Roman Catholic
countries has as a result taken the distinctive forms of anti-clericalism
and religious indifference. The church advocates a Christian state, that
is, one in which the church is recognized fully and exclusively by the
state. It opposes separation, for in its eyes the human being is not com-
posed of two separate elements. It opposes indifferentism in society as
much as it does heresy or schism, as Leo XIII makes clear in the
encyclical Humanum Genus.10 The special position of the church as a
sovereign body enables it also to negotiate Concordats. Yet the head of
the church may compromise when he deems the interests of the church
better served, as when Pius XI approved of the separation regime in
Chile. Many of these propositions were stated in the Syllabus of Errors
appended to the Encyclical Quanta Cura in 1864.14
The Roman Catholic Church has elaborated its own principles
concerning the economic and social organization of the Christian state.'0 5
These principles were eloquently affirmed in Leo XIII's Rerum Novarum
in 1891, a part of which is based on the teachings of Saint Thomas
Aquinas. 6 This encyclical determined the relation of the individual to
the community and emphasized that the social order should be at the
service of man. Nineteenth century liberalism placed too much em-
phasis on material enrichment, and socialism was denounced for its
atheism as well as its materialism. The church is both anti-individualist
and anti-collectivist.
100. Ibid.
101. Id. at 29-32; ROMMEN, THE STATE IN CATHOLIC THOUGHT 507 (1945).
102. LATREILLE & SIEGFRIED, op. cit. supra 32-41. ROMMEN, op. cit. supra 219.
103. For selections from this as well as other Encyclicals of Leo XIII, see MIRBT,
QUELLEN ZUR GESCHICHTE DES PAPSTUMS UND DES ROMISCHEN KATHOLIZIsMUs 474-502
(4th ed. 1924).
104. LATREILLE & SIEGFRIED, op. cit. supra note 99, at 41-46. The actual text of the
Syllabus is in MIRBT, op. cit. supra at 450. Translation in EHLER & MORRALL, CHURCH AND
STATE THROUGH THE CENTURIES: A COLLECTION OF ILLUSTRATIVE DOCUMENTS 281-85 (1954).
105. CHENON, LE ROLE SOCIAL DE L'EGLISE 225 (1928). LATREILLE & SIEGFRIED, op. cit.
supra at 51; ROMMEN, op. cit. supra note 101, at 606.
106. See text at note I supra. The Encyclical is analyzed in CHENON, op. cit. supra
225-95.
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Leo XIII also emphasized the importance of the family, of marriage
and of its indissolubility. Marriage is not a contract; the family is a
genuine society.0 7 The Pope following Saint Thomas establishes the
legitimacy of private property, using Biblical texts such as GenesiO
1:29. But property carries with it responsibilities to others and to the
poor in particular. Labor was held sacred, though its sanctity and role
in society were neglected in the 17th and 18th centuries.
The role of the Roman Catholic Church in the past one hundred
years has been determined by several factors. The personalities of a suc-
cession of Popes which included such striking figures as Pius IX, Leo XIII
and Pius XI have played their part. Important events already noted in
the history of the national churches, such as the Kulturkampi in
Germany, the Separation Law in France, and the Lateran Treaty in Italy
have profoundly influenced the church and the countries involved in
the struggles and negotiations. Finally, international movements in the
areas of thought and action such as socialism and totalitarianism in
addition to liberalism and democracy, have profoundly influenced the
relations of the church with governments in the 19th and 20th cen-
turies. l 8
VII
The conflicts of the Roman Catholic Church with the liberal state
in France, Germany and Italy following 1870 may be regarded as
historic incidents rather than ineluctable clashes. In one country after
another, when statesmanship was applied on both sides, these conflicts
proved soluble. This becomes clear if we review some of the main de-
velopments in the national histories of these countries.
A. Germany
In Germany the conflict with the Roman Catholic Church known
as the Kulturkampf did not originate in ideological differences. It was
due to the political leadership of Virchow and the Liberal party rather
than to Bismarck that the use of the label to describe a conflict prompted
by national rather than ideological interests became accepted.'01 For it
was the danger to the newly won unity of the Empire represented by a
possible alliance of Austria-Hungary and other Roman Catholic powers
that made Bismarck turn against the Centre Party which, together with
the Social Democrats, he regarded as "enemies of the Empire.
' 'l)0a
107. LATREILLE & SIEGFRIED, op. cit. supra note 99, at 59; EHLER & MORRALL, op. Cit.
supra note 104, at 329.
108. EHLER, TWENTY CENTURIES OF CHURCH AND STATE 86, 109, 130 (1957). RoMmem,
op. cit. supra note 101, at 563, 580.
109. Conze, The German Empire, in 11 NEW CAMBRIDGE MODERN HISTORY 287
(Hinsley ed. 1962).
109a. Id. at 288.
1963]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
This concern for national unity prompted the passing of the May
Laws in 1873,1°b which attempted to subject the Roman Catholic Church
to State authority in matters of clerical training, examination, appoint-
ment, and discipline as well as the institution of civil marriage. 1 °
In the same way, it was the alleviation of this concern about
foreign danger through the rapprochement with Austria-Hungary in
1879, that brought an end to the Kulturkampi between 1879 and 1887."'
The accession of Leo XIII in 1878 undoubtedly assisted the process of
accommodation, but it must not be forgotten that Bismarck himself
was averse to continuing a struggle which he had never sought for
ideological reasons.
The best evidence of the fact that the 19th century conflicts were
due to historic circumstances and personalities as much as to any
supposed incompatibility between the liberal state and the Roman
Catholic Church lies in the paradoxical fact that while the Kulturkampj
was being resolved in Protestant Germany, the struggle in Catholic
France and Italy was pursuing an opposite course. Each of these countries
requires a separate treatment.
B. France
The process by which the relations between the two powers were
transformed and the principles of religious and political liberty accepted
occupies the whole of French history to practically the 20th century.1
2
Not until 1905 were church and state definitely separated and the
conception of a single legal power in the state fully realized. Yet not-
withstanding the lack of clarity in the conception of sovereignty, the
principles of freedom of conscience and of religious worship have been
gradually recognized, especially since the Revolution.
The church in the Middle Ages not only regulated a great part of
the life of secular society, thus sharing with the state common subjects
who had all received baptism; she also exercised an exclusive control
over the clergy, justifying her claim to be a "perfect society" distinct,
for this purpose, from secular societies. The French Church had its own
government headed by the Pope, its own law, its own property and its
own courts.
13
The attempt of the church, on this basis, to emancipate itself from
certain controls exercised by civil rulers, was the essence of the Investi-
109b. The text of these laws can be found in MIRBT, QUELLEN No. 613, at 471. English
excerpts can be found in EHLER & MORRALL, op. cit. supra note 104, at 291.
110. Conze, op. cit. supra note 109, at 287.
111. Ibid. Compare the treatment of these events by Oncken, The German Empire, in
12 CAMBRmGE MODERN HISTORY 147-49 (Ward & others ed. 1910).
112. 2 EsmrEiN, ELEMENTS DE DROIT CONSTrruTIoNNEL FRANgAIS ET COMPAI 601 (7th
ed. 1921).
113. Id. at 605-06.
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ture Controversy. This attempt was unsuccessful. The king gradually
established his power over the church in France, a power over discipline
and over appointment of clergy called "the rights, franchises and liberties
of the Gallican Church."' 14 Some of this power the king shared with the
Pope; thus the church in France enjoyed a certain consideration as a
distinct society that still smacked of the theory of the two powers. The
treaties negotiated by the kings with the Popes called Concordats, es-
pecially that of Bologna in 1516, added to the impression that in spite of
the increasing emphasis on the legal power of the state a second power
continued to exist. 115
Liberty of conscience was extended to Protestants in 1787.16 From
1598 to 1685 a limited toleration of conscience and of worship had been
accorded to Protestants. Since the French Revolution every French
regime has acknowledged and extended this right in law and, to a large
extent, in practice. It is true that the law of November, 1814, concerning
the celebration of Sundays and holidays was, at the time, an infringe-
ment of the principle." 7 No one could foresee then that the principle
would be extended to include not only every kind of religious belief, but
even disbelief, that public schools in France would be held to a strict
neutrality in matters of faith, and that this freedom would be subject, like
every other, only to limitations dictated by the needs of public order and
of the state.
Up to the time of the Revolution, with the exception already noted
of the Protestant Church from 1598 to 1685, it was the Roman Catholic
Church that enjoyed liberty of worship, a liberty that was in fact a
monopoly, as is clearly indicated in the Edict of Fontainebleau in 1685,
which revoked the Edict of Nantes."' Liberty of the cult conceived as an
individual right and not as a group privilege, is one of the more recent
conquests of political civilization-one not yet recognized in all countries
of Europe.
Freedom of worship, or as Europeans call it, liberty of the cult,
has presented in fact a much more difficult problem than freedom of
conscience."" For the public practice of religion was regarded almost
up to the present century, as a matter of corporate, or group privilege.
The French Revolution, realizing some of the conceptions of the lay
state, first acknowledged this vital individual right in principle. Yet its
application was unusual, to say the least. Examples of attempts to
establish a civic religion in accord with the teachings of Rousseau' 2"
114. Id. at 607.
115. Id. at 609, 611.
116. Id. at 607-08.
117. Id. at 564, 602.
118. Id. at 607; ESME.N, COURs ELEMENTAIRE D'HSTORE nu Daorr FRANgAiS 645-47
(15th ed. 1930); EHERa & MORRALL, op. cit. supra note 104, at 208.
119. 2 Es MEN, op. cit. supra note 112, at 603.
120. BuRY, A HISTORY OF FREEDOM OF THOUGHT 110-13 (1947). See ROUSSEAU, SOCIAL
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included the Civil Constitution of the Clergy which has been called the
"bastard product of Gallicanism and 18th century philosophy,"' 21 and
the Cult of the Supreme Being, which was the creation of the incor-
ruptible Robespierre. Eventually the Revolution proceeded to the separa-
tion of church and state, which was a more realistic recognition of the
lay principle. The Concordat of 1801, negotiated by Napoleon, put an
end to this regime which, according to some authorities, represented the
desires of a majority of the French people at the turn of the 19th century.
It has taken over a century, according to this school of thought, for
France to return to the proper system in which individual rights receive
recognition formerly accorded to group privileges.' 22
From the French Revolution to 1905 France hesitated between the
two systems. One was based on the clear-cut conception of sovereignty
elaborated by the jurist Bodin and by Rousseau, and involved the ideal of
the lay state, as represented by the education laws of the French states-
man Jules Ferry in the 1880's.123 The other was based on the idea of the
two powers inherited from the Middle Ages.'24 So far as the principles of
individual conscience and of worship are concerned, it must be conceded
that the regime of separation in France has fully realized them in most of
their logical implications.
The events preceding, surrounding and following the passage of
the Separation Law of 1905 are revealing not only of the interplay be-
tween law and public opinion, but of the influence exerted by leadership
independently of the shifting party policies of the Third Republic.
The Dreyfus case had brought republican opinion into sharp conflict
with Roman Catholic and military circles. Pope Leo XIII, the spqnsor
of the ill-fated policy of Ralliement, died on July 20, 1903 and his suc-
cessor, Pius X, lacked his political finesse. 2 ' Combes, as President of
the French Council, had already begun the battle with the Vatican over
the interpretation and application of several provisions of the Concordat,
especially the nobis nominavit, and over his action in appointing three
Bishops without prior consultation and approval of the Vatican. 2 ' At
this point a dispute arose between the French government and the Pope
CoNTRAcT (1762). It has been said about Rousseau that he "inflamed everything and
solved nothing" through his democratic teachings.
121. 2 ESMEIN, op. cit. supra note 112, at 609.
122. Id. at 115.
123. Nr, The French Republic, in 11 NEw CAMBRMGE MODERN HISTORY 304-05
(Hinsley ed. 1962).
124. 2 ESMEiN, op. cit. supra note 112, at 609. The principal legislative acts concerning
the relations of church and state under the Third Republic will be found conveniently
assembled in the appendices to 2 DEBIDOUR, L'EGLISE CATHOLIQUE ET L'ETAT SOUS LA
TROISI&E RAPUBLIQUE 1870-1906 (1909).
125. BoURGiN, LA TRoIsILsE RiPUBLIQUE 165 (1956); LEPOINTE, HISTOIRE DES INS'rI-
TUTIONS Du DROIT PUBLIC FRANqAIS AU XIXe SILCLE 1789-1914, at 627 (1952).
126. BouRGiN, op. cit. supra; 2 EsmEiN, op. cit. supra note 112, at 614.
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concerning the disciplining by the latter of two French bishops. When
added to the misunderstandings already caused by the Pope's protest
against the visit of President Loubet to the King of Italy, the effect was
a severe hardening of political opinion, especially among the radicals
and the parties of the Left.
Waldeck-Russeau had already protested against the manner in
which his successor, Combes, insisted on applying the Association Law
of 1901, which the former had initiated. This law embodied not only a
"general text of public law but an offensive measure against the
Church."' 27 Now it was Combes who proceeded to carry through the
separation of church and state by the Law of December 9, 19 0 5,227"
though his tenure as President of the Council had ceased and his in-
fluence was exerted only in the Senate through his leadership of the
democratic Left in that chamber.1
21
This law, as originally conceived by its rapporteur Briand (the
French socialist turned moderate), assisted by Mejan (the future Director
of the Cults), was not aimed at a complete revocation of the Concordat
of 1801. The recent study by Mejan's daughter of the early stages of
this legislation indicates that what began as a reasonable move in favor
of a revision of the Concordat, ended under the influence of the ex-
seminarian, Combes, in an extreme measure.
The Concordat had been interpreted as a bilateral agreement, or
treaty, by the Papacy, but was treated as a unilateral concession by the
sovereign French State in the legislation of 1905. The exact character
of a Concordat had, for several centuries, been a matter of dispute be-
tween advocates of church authority and those of state sovereignty.'1s
Naturally, the former insisted that a Concordat was an act, principally,
of papal grace, while the latter regarded it as a concession of state power
taking the form of regular legislation, particularly inasmuch as it dealt
with the internal affairs of a country.
The Law of 1905 raised numerous questions that could only be
solved in time. The free exercise of religious worship extended to all
persons meant more than it had under the previous legal and constitu-
tional arrangements. Article two, which stated that the Republic does not
recognize, salary or support any cult, led to difficulties of application.
What was to be done with the property of the churches, and how was its
administration to be handled? The government sought to turn the
127. BouRnw, op. cit. supra at 160-61.
127a. Original in 2 DEBIDOUR, L'EoLiSE CATHOLIQUE ET L'ETAT EN FRANCE SOUS LA
TROiSIkmE RPUBLIQUE 1870-1906, at 577 (1909), reproducing JOURNAL OrnCIEL DE LA
REPUBLIQUE FRANqAISE (Dec. 9, 1905).
128. BOURGIN, op. cit. supra note 125, at 128. English text in EH-LER & MORaALL, op.
cit. supra note 104, at 355.
129. MAN, LA StPARATION DES EGLiSES ET DE L'ETAT 135 (1959).
130. 2 ESmEiN, op. cit. supra note 112, at 607, 610.
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property over to associations of the cult, but, though Protestant and
Jewish bodies complied, this was not acceptable to authorities of the
Roman Catholic Church. 18' The care of the property of the churches
and of the church edifices was eventually entrusted to the Catholic
authorities by permitting the latter to utilize the general rights of
association without recourse to associations cultuelles.'82 Public feeling
on both sides gradually subsided, and it was possible to secure a more
reasonable application of the Law of Separation. The names of Briand
and Clemenceau figured largely in these moves. 88
The post-World War I era brought a general improvement of rela-
tions between the French Republic and the Vatican. Beginning with the
reestablishment of diplomatic ties and with a move by Briand in 1921 to
recognize "diocesan associations" as fulfilling the requirements of the
1905 legislation8 and continuing with Mejan's intervention in the
Senate in 1926 in support of the extension of this principle, the new cur-
rent of opinion produced the laws of 1942 and 1945-1946, which brought
a modus vivendi with the Roman Catholic Church on the basis of the
Separation Law. 8 5
The development of new types of legal relations between church and
state in France since 1905 teaches some important lessons. Behind the
purely legal aspects of these changes stands a public opinion that overtly
or otherwise is constantly altering constitutional and juristic arrange-
ments. If the Separation Law was conceived by Combes in an anticlerical
spirit the effects of the law have been far other than expected. The church
has been able to adapt herself marvelously to the new situation, but
the parties of the Left have been placed in the paradoxical position of
regretting the absence of a concordat with the Pope that would enable
the state to exercise greater control over the French Church.8 6 The
Gallican tendencies of the French Church have been more or less effec-
tively arrested and papal control tremendously reinforced. Owing to
the peculiar circumstances in the post-World War II era in France, as
in Italy, which have placed anywhere from twenty to thirty per cent
of the electorate in the Communist Party and thus fostered government
party alliances on the center and right, certain political questions have
received solutions other than those expected when the left played a
greater role in government. 37 This is particularly true of the "School
Question," which has been resolved in recent legislation in a manner
131. LEPOINTE, L'EGLISE sT L'ETAT EN FRANCE 111 (1960).
132. BOURGIN, op. cit. supra note 125, at 173.
133. Id. at 167-73.
134. LEPOINTE, op. cit. supra note 131, at 122.
135. Id. at 123; MfJAN, op. cit. supra note 129, at 511, 512.
136. LEPoiNTE, op. cit. supra note 131, at 125.
137. SETON-WATSON, NEITHER WAR NOR PEACE 34 (1960). Readers will note, however,
recent significant changes in Italy in this respect. The French situation is more difficult to
define.
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favorable to the claims of parochial schools for state financial support.
This legislation, the Law of December, 1 9 59 ,1 37a was carried in the
two houses respectively by 427 votes to 71, and 173 votes to 99.1"' The
same current enabled the Mouvement Rgpublicain Populaire, a party
alignment inspired by principles of the Roman Catholic Church, to
play a considerable role in the post-World War II era." 9
C. Italy
In Italy nothing less than the existence of the new Italian Kingdom
was involved after 1870. The Pope refused to recognize the occupation
of the papal territories, especially of Rome, rejected the Law of Guar-
antees offered in expiation by the new Italian parliament in May, 1871,
forbade Italian Catholics to participate in political life, and encouraged,
overtly or otherwise, foreign intervention in behalf of the Papacy's claims
to the lost temporal domain. 40 Not until 1929 were the relations between
Italy and the Papacy normalized.
The experience of Italy in recent times shows sharp differences and
even discrepancies between law and practice. The Lateran Pacts of
February, 1929,140a included a treaty between the Holy See and the
Italian government regarding the territorial status of the Papal State,
a Concordat governing the status of the Roman Catholic Church in
Italy, and a financial convention renewing and modernizing some of
the provisions of the Law of Papal Guarantees.' Provisions such as
the reaffirmation of the Statute of 1848,11'a establishing the Roman
Catholic Church as the exclusive state religion, appear in the Treaty and
not where they would ordinarily be sought, in the Concordat. 4 2 The
price paid by the Pope for the Lateran Pacts was the suppression of the
Popular Party and its able leader, Don Sturzo."' The Church acquired a
vested interest in the Fascist regime through the Italian bonds in which
compensation was made by the State.4
Contrary to expectations, the fall of Fascism did not bring a breach
137a. Law No. 59-1557, Dec. 31, 1959, concerning Les rapports de 'etat avec 'enseigne-
ment privi, JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA REPUBLIQUE FRANIAISE.
138. LEoiNTE, op. cit. supra note 131, at 138; MGRINE, LA QUESTION SCOLAIRE EN
FRANcE 65-69 (1960).
139. WILLIAMS, PoLrICS IN POST-WAR FRANCE: PARTIES AND THE CONSTITUTION IN THE
FOURTH REPUBLIC 16, 17, 24-25, 41, 240, 396, 398 (2d ed. .1958); ETNAUDI & GocuxL,
CHRISTIAN DEMOCRACY IN ITALY AND FRANCE 109 (1952).
140. SMITH, ITALY: A MODERN HISTORY 191, 222-26, 275 (1959).
140a. Original in ACTA APOSTOLICAE SEDIS 209 (1929).
141. SMITH, op. cit. supra note 140, at 440-43; BINCHY, CHURCH AND STATE IN FASCIST
ITALY 17-18 & passim (1941). English text in EHLER & MO.RALL, op. cit. supra note 104,
at 382.
141a. Original statute 1848-1849 in CONTUZZI, DIrrTo CONSTITUZIONALE (1907) ; French
translation in 1 DARESTE, LES CONSTITUTIONS MODERNES 674 (1910).
142. WEBB, CHURCH AND STATE IN ITALY 1947-1957, at 6 (1958).
143. Id. at 4.
144. BINCHY, op. cit. supra note 141, at 314.
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between the new Italian government and the Papacy. Rather it produced
a renewal of the Lateran Pacts in spite of the inconsistencies with the
new Constitution which these documents embody. Even the Communists
supported the renewal of the 1929 argeements. Later, it is true, their
attitude changed, for reasons of internal politics.'45 Christian democracy
in Italy, which profited from these changes, has brought with it an
important change of emphasis in the relations of church and state.
In opposition to the liberal and secularist tradition of the Risorgimento,
it has tended to downgrade state sovereignty and, as an unforeseen
effect, to promote European unity. 46
Though the articles of the Constitution expressly recognize freedom
of religion and of religious worship, which, as has been suggested above,
directly contradict some of the provisions of the Lateran Pacts, there
is a further breach between theory and practice in the fact that Protestant
groups do not feel that they have enjoyed the freedom to which the
Constitution entitles them. Apologists for the system have sought to
rationalize the special treatment accorded to Protestants by suggesting
that equality is impossible to achieve between a large organization like
the Roman Catholic Church and small sects which lack stability or
permanence. 47 It also has been argued, with varying degrees of subtlety,
that the sects involved in harassment by the authorities belong to the
eccentric fringe of Protestantism.
The history of the constitutional court set up under the Constitution
and the resignation in 1957 of its chief justice, De Nicola, cannot be
properly assessed as yet. Undoubtedly problems of church-state relations
have had something to do with the curtailment of the tribunal's
activities. 48
The relations of the Christian Democratic Party with the Roman
Catholic Church cannot be clearly defined. In theory it is an autonomous
party. In practice, much of its ideological orientation is Catholic and
presumably church-inspired. 4 9
The picture of present day Italy drawn by the foremost student
of Italian church-state relations, Jemolo, may indeed be "somber," but
it deserves restating. He depicts a transformation of Italian life that
has turned the new Italy into a "confessional State." The only thing
that explains this change in public opinion is the decay of the liberal
state, which is due to at least two causes. First is the absence of strong
145. WEBB, op. cit. supra note 142, at 20-22, 31. For the English text of the Constitu-
tion adopted Dec. 22, 1947 and effective Jan. 1, 1948, see 2 PEASLEE, CONSTITUTIONS OF
NATIONS 482-505 (1956).
146. EINAUDI & GOcUEL, op. cit. supra note 139, at 96; WEBB, op. cit. supra note 142,
at VII-X; JEMOLO, CHURCH AND STATE IN ITALY 1850-1950, at 336-37 (Moore transl. 1960).
147. WEBB, op. cit. supra note 142, at 27-28; JEMOLO, op. cit. supra 309.
148. WEBB, op. cit. supra note 142, at 30-41.
149. Id. at 46-48.
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religious minorities in Italy. Then, he recalls, in the 19th and early 20th
centuries liberals and later Socialists were opposed to church attempts
to control civil society. "But the situation has changed radically since
the exhaustion of liberalism and the growth of the sharp contrast between
Socialist parties not clearly aligned against Communism and other
parties.'
'150
In support of his claim that Italy is a confessional state, the author
marshals an array of arguments, all emphasizing that "the State has
fulfilled all its obligations towards the Roman Catholic Church but not
toward other communions."'' The penal code prescribes penalties for
vilification of the Catholic religion but not of others. It bans Malthusian
propaganda."5 2 Property inherited from Fascist organizations is often
reserved for use by religious bodies. 53 Italian and Papal flags can often
be seen flying together. 54 There is no anti-Semitism, yet no Jew has held
a political position of importance and "it is inconceivable that a Jew
should be mayor of a big town."' 55 The authorities restrict the influence
of Waldensians, Pentecostals and other Protestant bodies.' 56 "A con-
version of a Catholic to Protestantism today would be regarded as a
challenge to the existing order."'15 The contrast with the French Catholic
left with its tradition of independence inherited from the author
Montalembert and the priest Lacordaire is striking. 58 In explanation, the
author points out that we are now living in the "economic" age and
that non-economic matters arouse little interest; that this is also the age
of the group, of the "vast social unit," as well as an age of "feeling rather
than of reason."'
59
Jemolo discerns, in fact, as others have done, an anti-Risorgimento
tradition taking over, and cites De Gasperi as representative of this
attitude.' 0 He concludes, "A hundred years. The passions of three,
perhaps of four generations; the triumph and eclipse of the doctrines of
liberalism, the unexpected realization of a Guelph State a century after
the collapse of neo-Guelph hopes."''
However we are to regard this thesis-and it is not unchallenged
-it goes far to confirm the observation of Dicey in England that the
150. JEMOLO, op. cit. supra note 146, at V-VI.
151. Id. at 309.
152. Id. at 310.
153. Id. at 311.
154. Ibid.
155. Id. at 315.
156. Ibid.
157. Id. at 316.
158. Id. at 326.
159. Id. at 330-31.
160. Id. at 336.
161. Id. at 339.
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movement of legislation cannot be understood without reference to
currents of opinion other than the main one, i.e., to the historic process.
The 20th century, while it witnessed an improvement in relations
between the Roman Catholic Church and the national State in Italy,
France and Germany, at least in the period immediately following World
War I, also saw a new threat to all Christian churches in the rise of the
totalitarian State especially in Germany and in Russia. This threat trans-
formed the Roman Catholic Church in Western Europe from a defender
of traditional non-liberal regimes, as in the 19th century, into a more
frequent supporter of democratic and liberal political systems. 6' The
same threat has driven home to members of Orthodox and Protestant as
well as Catholic groups a sense of common danger.
Since the Second World War, Roman Catholic Action and Christian
Democracy have, as a consequence, increasingly affected and sometimes
dominated political life in Holland, Belgium, Italy, Germany and
France.'68 That this has taken place in countries of Teutonic as well
as Latin culture and under varying regimes of jurisdiction as well as
separation is a tribute, not only to the renewed vigor of the Roman
Catholic Church, but to the benefits conferred on the Church by the
voluntary status of religion in general in the liberal-democratic state.
VIII
In the United States, as in the European countries, the problem of
the relations of church and state has undergone transformation in re-
sponse to the developing world situation as well as to internal changes
involving religion. These internal changes hinge on three forces which
mold the social and inevitably the political life of this country. The first
of these, and the traditional one, is Protestantism, bearing with it the
leaven of Puritaiism. Protestantism itself has shown three tendencies of
varying potency: fundamentalism, liberalism and religious inventiveness.
It has embraced in great measure the social gospel, which, in the words
of the late Professor Siegfried, "when combined with humanism, produced
a particular social idealism founded on the conviction that religion does
not accomplish its mission if it does not socially ameliorate the indi-
vidual."' 64 American Protestantism, in spite of its seeming variety,
possessed a common ethos, and attained a consensus on a number of vital
questions having a legislative impact, such as Sunday observance and
restraints on gambling and other activities broadly described as vice.
Above all was this revealed in the peculiar position of the American
public school, Christian but not denominational, capable of providing an
162. Ensor, Political Institutions in Europe, in 12 NEW CAMBRIDGE MODERN HISTORY
95-96 (Thomson ed. 1960).
163. FOGARTY, CHRISTIAN DEsocIAcy iN WESTERN EUROPE 1820-1953, at 294, 318, 340,
377 (1957).
164. LATRELLE & SiErsFssm, LES FORCES RELIcEmUSES ET LA ViE POLITIQUE 205 (1951).
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education acceptable in terms of a broad Protestantism. This consensus
also outlawed subventions to religiously sponsored schools.
The term separation describes a legal relationship in the United
States but hardly covers the manifold ties that otherwise exist between
the political power and the churches in accord with the Protestant-Ameri-
can ethos. To de Tocqueville, organized religion and democracy, antag-
onists on the European scene, worked harmoniously together in the
United States, and he found the explanation of this anomaly in the
principle of the separation of church and state.'65 Still, Harriet Martineau
was certain that social pressures were inimical to the practice of full
religious freedom, notwithtanding the voluntary basis of religious
affiliation. 6 '
If the abandonment of religious tests for office and the disqualifica-
tion of clergy for public office are examples of separation, how are we to
characterize a catalogue of continuing religious activities and state
interventions? It would be out of place to list, let alone describe or
analyze, all the anomalies that remain in the application of the legal
principle of separation. The continuance of religious exercises in state-
sponsored establishments; the penalties still existing for blasphemy;
much social legislation dealing with labor and education which shows the
influence of religious groups; the imposition of social attitudes by
various churches in such cases as prohibition, divorce, and even pacifism,
all these and more show the continued interaction of law and religious
opinion and belie both the spirit and the letter of much separationist
legislation.
167
A few particulars concerning sundry legal problems may be noted.
Some states allow churches to incorporate and carry on secular activities
related to religious purposes, but no limits have been placed on the
latter, thus giving unfair advantage to religious corporations over
private business "in that the former do not share the legal burdens and
responsibilities of the latter."' 68 The legal relation of an individual
member to a religious society is not clear in many states. "In five states,
where the relation is considered contractual a member may invoke the
power of a civil court."'69 Torpey bemoans the exemption of church
property from taxation, which places heavier burdens on non-exempt
165. 1 DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRATIE EN AMiRIQUE 18 (1864); 2 DE TOCQUEVILLE,
supra 208-11, 221-32.
166. 2 MARTINEAU, SOCIETY IN AMERICA, pt. IV, at 335 (1837), cited by GREENE,
RELIGION AND THE STATE-THE MAKING AND TESTING OF AN AMERICAN TRADITION 100
(1959).
167. GREENE, op. cit. supra 94-118.
168. TORPEY, JUDIcIAL DOCTRINES OF RELIGIOUS RIGHTS IN AMERICA 327 (1948);
GREENE, op. cit. supra note 166, at 106; HowE, CASES ON CHURCH AND STATE IN THE
UNITED STATES 94-152 (1952).
169. TORPEY, op. cit. supra 327.
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property.17° Eight states in 1950 required a witness to "believe in divine
punishment, or in'the existence of a Supreme Being, in order to be
competent to testify.'
7'
The fact is also that considerations of public order must qualify
and therefore circumscribe the religious liberty guaranteed in the laws.
The history of the relations of the state with Mormons, Witnesses of
Jehovah and other groups illustrates this theme. 72
Professor Greene's conclusion that "religion and politics cannot
be kept in watertight compartments" is one that no conservative student
would question . 71 "Cooperative Separation" is the felicitous formula
used by a recent writer to describe what is esssentially a mutual rather
than a unilateral flow of influence. 174 The effect of recent legislation and
court decisions, to be sure, has been to enlarge the area of liberty-
especially liberty from religion-considerably. 75 But whether this is a
result of rules governing relations of church and state or is an effect of
enlightened public opinion and growing secularism it is difficult to say.
The second of the forces working in this country is the Roman
Catholic Church. The growth in the number of its followers and the
rise in its influence have had in recent years, and will have, a powerful
impact upon legislation. For the Roman Catholic Church, more so than
the Protestant, has a systematic position on political questions and on the
social and economic organization of a community. This is not the
occasion to enter into a description of these teachings so far as they
affect the Church in the United States, but there is one area of public
life on which official Catholic pronouncements differ radically from the
mass of public and Protestant opinion, namely, education. The control
by the parent and by the Church of the child's education is a cardinal
tenet of the Catholic faith reiterated in several provisions of the Codex
Juris Canonici (Canons 1372, 1373, 1374, 1381, 1382).1 7' This principle
has not only arrayed the Roman Catholic Church against legislation such
as statutes which would mandate attendance at public schools, but has
led the Bishops of the Church to demand financial aid for parochial
schools.
In the United States the voluntary principle has enabled the Roman
Catholic Church to secure favorable treatment from legislatures, as in
170. Id. at 328.
171. Id. at 330.
172. GREENE, op. cit. supra note 166, at 98-99, 114-15.
173. Id. at 118.
174. KAUPER, CIVIL LIBERTIES AND THE CONSTITUTION 3 (1962).
175. Id. at 5-51. See the recent United States Supreme Court decision, Engle. v.
Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962), concerning the New York Regents School Prayer, as well as
other pending cases in state and federal courts.
176. Extracts from the Codex can be found in MIRBT, QUELLEN zua GESCHICHTE DES
PAPSTUMS UIND DES RbMISCEN KATHOLIZISMUS 534 (4th ed. 1924).
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the New York State Law of 1895 and its amendments17°a governing
religious corporations, which became models for this kind of legislation.1
7
If the Roman Catholic Church thus exerts influence on political action
in the United States, the same cannot be said, to any extent, of the
reaction of political authority to the Church. This is the penalty the
secularized State pays for the absence of an ecclesiastical policy. The
political left in France, as already indicated, has become aware of this
unexpected result of separation. One is reminded of the dilemma posed
to government by the growth of trusts in the 1880's. Public policy toward
small and large business was in theory the same, and was based on a
laissez faire philosophy of government. But when this original equality
of treatment seemed to promote concentrations of wealth and business
power at the expense of small business, the policy of laissez faire had to
be abandoned in favor of discriminatory legislation. There seems little
likelihood of the adoption of a regulatory policy toward churches in the
United States, as has been undertaken in the past by European countries.
Instead, public opinion will operate in the private rather than the public
sector, making use of the press and other media to favor or oppose specific
measures and policies advocated by one church or another.
The third influence working in the United States is more difficult
to define, though its effects are palpable and demonstrable in the large.
This is the tendency, already noted, towards secularism, which has
challenged traditional attitudes and institutions, such as Bible reading
in the public schools and provisions in state laws regulating or forbidding
birth control measures. Its strength has been waxing in recent years.
The changes taking place in the relative distribution of these forces
among the population spell new challenges as well as problems for
American democracy. The historic role of church-state conflict in
Western civilization, in the words of Ruggiero, has been to promote
individual liberty. 78 The existence of countervailing forces capable of
impeding governmental despotism offers a promise of the continued
survival of liberal values in this country. It is assumed that the threat
of a theocratic despotism once posed to Western societies is now a
chimera. If, as some contend, it is not, then the state will have to con-
tinue to balance and even restrain the pretensions of the church. In
either case the development will be in keeping with the "genius of Amer-
ican politics" which is itself the product of the dualism inherent in the
176a. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1895, ch. 723 (General Laws ch. XLII). For the modifications
of this law, see 6 WHITE, CORPORATIONS OF THE STATE OF NEw YORK: RELIGIOUS CORPORA-
TIONS LAW 3-145, 227-30 (Clark 12th ed. 1950).
177. DIGNAN, A HISTORY OF THE LEGAL INCORPORATION OF CATHOLIC CHURCH PROPERTY
IN THE UNITED STATES, ch. VIII, at 268 (1935); GREENE, op. cit. supra note 166, at 107;
RurFINs, RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 514-15 (1912). See HoWE, op. cit. supra note 168, at 96, for
a Pennsylvania case of 1911.
178. RUGGIERO, THE HISTORY OF EUROPEAN LIBERALISM 398 (1927).
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Western political tradition-a dualism that, it must be repeated, is
rooted in legal ideas and institutions.
As to the world scene, it would be premature to say that religion
has ceased to interact with politics or to exert its influence on the scales
of war and peace. Marxist dialectic and modern communism, like the
positive faiths, have elements proper to a religious system, namely, faith,
hope, the desire to belong, and the need to worship. The conflict of our
day, according to Professor Zaehner, is, therefore, one between two
opposing religious systems, one theistic, the other atheistic and materi-
alistic. "It is the doubtful privilege of the present generation to take
part in this second major installment of the wars of religion.' 179 The
author may be guilty of exaggeration, but his statement calls attention
to a profound truth. It is that political concepts in our day, such as
nationalism, democracy and communism, like the doctrinal ones of a
former age, will, or must, take the form of religious absolutes in order
to survive in conflicts with their rivals. "New Presbyter is but Old
Priest writ large."'' 0
179. ZAEHNER, NEW OUTLINE OF MODERN KNOWLEDGE 85 (Pryce-Jones ed. 1956).
180. Milton, Sonnet 19, On the New Forces of Conscience under the Long Parliament.
